We report on a simple experiment that addresses three factors in the frequency of cooperation: (i) framing, (ii) the number of players and (iii) the perceived risk of cooperating. We work with a (two-player) Prisoner's Dilemma and with a three-player, two-strategy Public Good Game.
All treatments were one-shot (no repetitions). Participants in the experiment played in only one treatment (between-subjects experiment). In each of the five treatments, they had to make a single decision between two alternatives. Except for the Framed PG treatment, where participants had to choose between TO CONTRIBUTE and NOT TO CONTRIBUTE, the two alternatives were named CIRCLE and SQUARE.
After entering their decision, participants were asked to give a brief explanation of their decision ("open-format explanation"). In all treatments except the Istanbul treatment, after providing the open-format explanation, participants had to choose among several alternatives for the "most influential reason in your decision" ("closed-format explanation").
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In all treatments:
The individual payoff of a player always increased by €5 if he/she switched from choosing CIRCLE/ TO CONTRIBUTE to SQUARE/ NOT TO CONTRIBUTE.
(ii) The sum of payoffs was maximized if everybody chose CIRCLE/ TO CONTRIBUTE, in which case everybody received €10. At the other extreme, if everybody chose SQUARE/ NOT TO CONTRIBUTE, then the individual payoffs were €6. Hence, in all our treatments universal cooperation increased individual payoffs by €4 relative to universal defection.
Istanbul Treatment
The Istanbul Treatment was a control designed to check the strength of the dominant strategy factor in a nonsocial situation. 
3-Person Frameless Public Good Treatment
In the 3-Person Frameless PG Treatment, each participant faced the payoff matrix of the Istanbul treatment, but, instead of the temperature in Istanbul, the columns corresponded to the number of 1 See the Appendix for the complete description of all treatments.
other participants in his/her 3-person group (randomly and anonymously constituted) who chose CIRCLE. Accordingly, the payoff matrix is given by Table 2 .2. Here and in the remaining treatments, the participants were informed that the payoffs of the other players were symmetric to theirs and, in fact, they were explicitly given the payoff matrices of the other players. 
3-Person Framed Public Good Treatment
In the 3-Person Framed PG Treatment, each participant faced the payoff matrix of the 3-Person
Frameless PG Treatment but, instead of CIRCLE and SQUARE, the choices we described as in the typical Public Good Game narrative of contributing a token in a group account, where it benefits the whole group (TO CONTRIBUTE), vs. investing it in a private account (NOT TO CONTRIBUTE).
Accordingly, the payoff matrix is given by Strictly speaking, rather that eliminating frames, our "frameless" treatments substitute the abstract framing of CIRCLE/SQUARE for the usual, more descriptive frames of contribution and cooperation. 3 In the traditional public good game, each player is endowed with a number of tokens (10, say), and she can decide how many to contribute to the group account, and how many to invest in her private account. Here she has only one token, so that she only has two alternatives, as in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In fact, this type of game has often been called "N-person Prisoner's Dilemma" in the literature.
2-Person Frameless Prisoner's Dilemma Treatment
In the 2-Person Frameless Prisoner's Dilemma Treatment the payoff matrix is given by To remove the risk due to the unknown decision of the other player/s, one can introduce sequential playing so that uncertainty is removed for the player who plays last (see, e. g., Kenneth
Clark and Martin Sefton, 2001) or implement a "strategy method" approach (as Urs Fischbacher et al., 2001) . We adopted a different procedure. The starting point was the 2-Person Frameless Prisoner's Dilemma game (Table 2.4 above). As before, the participants were randomly matched in pairs. But now they were told in addition that the computer would randomly choose (50% probability) one of them as active, and the other one as passive: the passive participant had to play CIRCLE necessarily. This removed the risk for the active players.
Compared to the Sequential Playing or Strategy Method designs, our approach neutralizes risk while eliminating in practice the reciprocity motive for cooperating. This simplifies the interpretation of the motivations behind the participants' decisions. As an added bonus, our method guarantees a substantial number of independent observations. In fact, by reversing the roles in a second part of the treatment, we reached a total of 88 decision makers, who made a single decision each.
Note that the resulting game has features similar to the Random Dictator game. The main difference lies in the options open to the "dictator:" in the canonical Random Dictator game, she can distribute in any way a fixed initial endowment, whereas here the "dictator" (i. e, the active player) chooses between allocating 10 and 10 euros, or 15 and 1 euros.
The payoff table of the active player thus simplifies to Table 2 .5.
The other player chooses CIRCLE
You choose CIRCLE You earn €10
You choose SQUARE You earn €15 After the active players had made their choices and expressed their reasons, and without informing of the active player's decisions, all participants were told that the experiment would continue with the active players turned into passive ones, and vice-versa. They were explicitly told that the active and passive players would be randomly matched again.
In this treatment, we went to some lengths to guarantee the anonymity of the decisions. Of course, in all treatments players were never aware of the decision of any other identifiable player.
But in the previous treatments the experimenters knew the earnings (and indirectly the decision) of each participant, since participants had to sign a receipt with their name and the amount earned.
Here, after getting a green light from the university Research Office, we implemented the following procedure.
(i) Before starting the experiment, each participant signed a document with his/her name acknowledging his/her participation in a paid experiment but, obviously, without stating any specific amount of money earned
(ii) At the end of the experiment, the next-to-last screen in each individual terminal displayed the total amount earned by the participant (as an active and as a passive player). After the participant clicked "Continue," the last screen simply showed a letter code (two possible letters for each of the possible amounts of earnings). A university beadle unrelated to the experiment walked past each participant handing a closed envelope (containing the appropriate earnings) marked with the letter that matched the one in the screen.
(iii) To justify the total expenditure of research funds, the experimenters submitted an affidavit stating the total amount included in the envelopes distributed, together with the documents signed by the participants.
The experiment
The participants were undergraduate students at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. We avoided economics and business majors, who may be too familiar with PD and PG games, so that most of them majored in law, political science or the humanities. We attempted, with approximate success, an equal number of men and women. The experiment took place at the BES_Lab of Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
The Istanbul Treatment was quite simple. Participants were individually taken to a separate room, where the instruction sheet was given. After they had made their choice, they were asked to provide the open-format explanation. Once completed, the temperature in Istanbul was checked and the participants paid accordingly. The Istanbul Treatment involved only seven participants.
Each of three treatments Frameless PG, Framed PG and Frameless PD was conducted in two sessions, involving from 21 to 24 participants, for a total of N = 47 in Frameless PG, N = 42 in Framed PG, and N = 46 in Frameless PD. Once they were all seated, the screen with instructions appeared, and the instructions were also read aloud. After all participants made their choices and clicked "continue," a second screen appeared asking for the open-format explanation and, after all participants clicked "continue," a third screen asked to choose the closed-format explanation. Next, each participant was informed of his/her earnings, was paid and left. The whole session lasted about half an hour.
The Riskless & Frameless PD was conducted in four sessions, with a total of N = 88
participants. See Section 2.5 above for a description. Each session lasted slightly more than half an hour. Table 1 presents the experimental results.
Results
The control "Istanbul" treatment yielded the predictable outcome of no CIRCLE choices. by a narrative of contributing to a common account, our experiment shows that this framing is fundamental. 5 An abstract presentation of the same game yields very low levels of cooperation.
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All the treatments mentioned in the following results are of the frameless variety.
Result 2. Reducing the number of players increases cooperation.
Our second result is that it matters whether it is a 2-person vs. 3-person game. We see more cooperation (28%) in the 2-Person Frameless Prisoner's Dilemma than in the 3-Person Frameless
Public Good Game (2%).
Our results also suggest more cooperation in the 2-Person Frameless Prisoner's Dilemma (28%) than in the 3-Person Framed PG Treatment (21%). Despite the pro-cooperation effect of the frame, going from an abstract 2-person game to a framed 3-person one decreases cooperation. 
Result 3. Neutralizing risk increases cooperation.
Neutralizing risk in the Frameless Prisoner's Dilemma increases cooperation from 28% to a notable 49%. As indicated above, and contrary to all other treatments, in the Riskless and Frameless PD decisions were anonymous also vis-à-vis the experimenters. Conceivably, anonymity by itself could reduce cooperation by diminishing possible experimenter effects, which makes the anonymous cooperation level of 49% even more remarkable for a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiment.
8 Daniele Nosenzo et al. (2015) also find more cooperation when the number of players is two rather than three, four or eight, in a different strategic setup (repeated 10-period Public Good game with variable levels of contribution).
Participants' comments
While difficult to quantify, the participants' explanation of their decisions, in both its open and closed formats, provides insights about their understanding of the issue and about their motivation.
Awareness of strategic dominance
Recall that in all treatments the "SQUARE," or "DO NOT CONTRIBUTE," option is a dominant strategy for the game with the experimental payoffs. 
Decision under risk
Among the remaining 78% of participants who chose SQUARE/DO NOT CONTRIBUTE in the Frameless PG, Framed PG and Frameless PD treatments, the most frequent explanations in the open format centered in risk taking ("choosing CIRCLE is too risky") and/or in maximizing the lowest payoff (€6 with SQUARE vs. €1 with CIRCLE).
But if you understand the dominant-strategy argument, and if you only care about the money payoff, then SQUARE first-order stochastically dominates CIRCLE, and risk considerations should be irrelevant.
9 Of course, in the 2-Person Riskless & Frameless PD Treatment, SQUARE is trivially a "Dominant Strategy" since the other player has a single option. 10 As indicated above, only the open format was used with the participants in the Istanbul Treatment. The remaining participant just said that the SQUARE choice was "safer and more convenient."
So why did so many among the participants who chose SQUARE/DO NOT CONTRIBUTE refer to risk? Granted, we should not underestimate the role of a lack of understanding of the Dominant Strategy property: this did not appear to be a problem in the Istanbul Treatment, but the information in the other treatments also included the payoffs of the other player or players, and even though the payoff tables were isomorphic, the additional information could conceivably have obscured the dominant-strategy property of SQUARE/DO NOT CONTRIBUTE.
Nevertheless, the wording of the explanations suggests that many of the participants who chose SQUARE/DO NOT CONTRIBUTE did initially find some attractiveness in the CIRCLE/CONTRIBUTE option, but realized that it had a serious downside if the other participant/s did not contribute, and decided not to take the risk. This suggests that some of the people who do not cooperate because they find cooperation too risky might, in fact, cooperate if they were assured that the other player or players do cooperate. This motivated our 2-Person Riskless & Frameless PD Treatment.
Decisions under certainty
As noted above, 51% of the participants in the 2-Person Riskless & Frameless PD Treatment chose SQUARE. In their explanations in the open format, except for the very few who evidenced a lack of understanding of the instructions, they all clearly stated that they chose SQUARE in order to maximize gains. Several tried to justify their decision not to cooperate (SQUARE) by referring to the fact that they were playing with a stranger. Others, among those who were active in the second part of the experiment, tried to justify their decision by envisioning that the corresponding active player in the first part had "obviously" inflicted SQUARE on them: they would then play SQUARE when active to compensate for the imagined low earnings in the first part.
Next, in the closed-format explanation of their decision, those who chose SQUARE faced the following list of reasons to choose from:
* I chose at random * It is the most profitable option for me * This game is similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which case theory tells us to make this decision.
By a large margin (84%), they chose the second option, whereas the remaining 16% chose the last one.
We were particularly interested in eliciting the reasons of those who chose CIRCLE. We focused our attention in the following possible motivations:
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Efficiency
Equity / Fairness
Altruism
We were also curious about the role of, in Roemer's (2015a, b) terms, the Kantian optimization protocol, i. e., the selection of the common strategy that would maximize the expected gains of a player facing a 50-50 chance of being active or passive.
To that end, the closed-format list had five options:
* I chose at random * It is the choice that I'd like everybody to make in this situation * I like to help others even at a cost to myself * In this manner, our joint earnings are higher * Taking advantage of others is not right.
The modal response (49%) was the fourth one, which indicates a concern for efficiency.
The second most frequent was the second one (37%), which suggests Kantian-type thinking.
Next came the last one (9%), which suggests fairness. Only 4% chose the third option, which is related to altruism. 12 (Nobody chose the first option.)
But the explanations in the open format (answered before they faced the closed-format list) provide a somewhat different picture. We disregard answers too confuse to be characterized (19%), and compute the frequencies among the 81% remaining ones. A large fraction of those (46%), which include many of those who chose the "Kantian" answer in the closed format, provided reasons related to fairness and equity. Next, 31% (including many of those who, consistently, choose the fourth option in the closed format) reasoned in terms of efficiency. The remaining 23% offered answers that combined elements of altruism, equity, efficiency and Kantian thinking.
11 Reciprocity, as a drive for cooperation (see, e. g., Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, 2011), does not have a natural fit in our experimental design because either the moves are simultaneous or one player does not choose freely (2-Person Riskless & Frameless PD: see Section 2.5 above). 12 Clark and Sefton (2001) also rule out altruism as the frequent motivation for cooperation, finding that reciprocity is the main factor. Our experiments suggest that, even in the absence of a role for reciprocity, altruism remains a minor motivation, whereas considerations of efficiency, and to a lesser extent fairness, dominate.
Conclusion
We have studied three factors affecting cooperation in 2-person Prisoner's Dilemmas and 3-person Public Good experiments:
1. Frames 2. Number of players 3. Risk.
We find that all three factors have a strong influence. As detailed in Section 4, cooperation increases:
* When moving from frameless 3-player (2%) to framed 3-player (21%) treatments.
* When moving from frameless 3-player (2%) to frameless 2-player (28%) treatments.
* When moving from frameless 2-player (28%) to riskless & frameless 2-player (49%)
treatments. The latter treatment was performed under anonymity, so that the experimenters could not observe or infer individual decisions.
In the (nonsocial) Istanbul treatment participants followed and clearly expressed the The scant role of altruism and the fact that efficiency played a larger role than fairness are surprising to some extent. It should be noted that the efficiency explanations were cast in terms of maximizing communal earnings rather than of avoiding waste.
The Kantian reasoning appears mostly in the form: "I, active, do what I'd like the other person to do were I passive," and usually combined with the notions of efficiency and fairness, which is not surprising in our simple, symmetric games.
APPENDIX

A.1. Istanbul Treatment
Participants were given a paper page with the following text. After they chose, they were orally asked to write, at the bottom, a short explanation of the reasons for their decision. The following screens appear in the stated order to a participant who has been randomly assigned as active in the first part and passive in the second part.
INSTRUCCIONES
A participant who, on the contrary, has been designated passive in the first part and active in the second part has screen 8 exchanged for screens 4, 5, 6A or 6B (i. e, the screens appear to him/her in the order 1, 2, 3, 8, 1, 4, 5, 6A or 6B, 9, 10) with the text of screens 4 and 8 slightly modified, so that 8 starts "Has sido designado jugador activo,"
and 4 starts "El experimento se repite, con la diferencia que ahora tú eres jugador pasivo."
